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P R E F A C E
The brief report and discussion contained in this communication 
most certainly raises many more questions than it attempts to answer. It 
reflects many of the inevitable shortcomings of research which has to be 
undertaken at very short notice virtually without any funds whatsoever.
Yet, we consider that, in the context of the rapidly if not 
dramatically changing alignment of political forces in Southern Africa, 
"emergency" research such as that reported in the current study may not 
only be interesting but very important for an understanding of socio­
political processes in the region.
The scope of the study has, of course, one very major short­
coming. The investigations did not cover reactions among Black South 
Africans. In a society such as ours, research among Black people is a 
task which has to be undertaken with a great deal of careful preparation 
and very expert interviewing. The amount of fear and suspicion is very 
great. Time and funds made such a venture impossible. A study designed 
partly to assess the reactions of Black South Africans to changes in 
neighbouring states is, however, being planned at the present time.
As far as the present study is concerned, credit must go to 
Raphael de Kadt for organising students and members of staff in the 
University to undertake telephone interviewing on a voluntary basis at 
very short notice. This enabled the interviewing, which was based on a 
schedule designed jointly by all three authors, to be completed within 
a stringent time-limit. Foszia Fisher and I designed the coding and 
computer analysis (with the former doing the actual coding). Foszia 
Fisher produced the initial draft report and interpretation on the 
results of the two telephone surveys. My contribution, aside from my 
part in the conceptualisation, was to provide an analysis of a third 
nation-wide empirical study, and to edit and co-ordinate the sections.
Grateful acknowledgement must be made of the financial
assistance provided by the Anglo American Corporation which sponsored the 
nation-wide investigation among Whites, the study which constitutes the 
third empirical basis of the present report.
The report is brief and in many ways flimsy, but we feel that 
it represents a modest attempt at the kind of research enterprise which 
hopefully will become more frequent in a changing sub-continent.
Professor Lawrence Schlemmer, 
Director.
Institute for Social Research, 
University of Natal,
Durban
October, 1975.
For many years there has been widespread international con­
demnation of apartheid and White minority rule in southern Africa. There 
has also been increasing direct pressure on the White government in South 
Africa. This has taken two main forms. South Africa has been increasingly 
isolated in international bodies, and has been expelled from a number of 
them. At the same time there has been increasing international support 
for guerilla movements wishing to overthrow White minority governments in 
southern Africa. These pressures have been clearly aimed at bringing about 
changes in South Africa's internal racial policies. It is important, 
therefore, to try to find out how White voters in South Africa see these 
pressures, and how they are likely to react to them. So far very little 
attention has been paid to this problem by social scientists in South Africa.
In an attempt to remedy this lack of knowledge we undertook limited 
studies of White reactions to two crucial events, each of which signalled a 
qualitative change in outside pressure. The first event was the imposition, 
by the Arab oil-producing states, of an oil boycott of South Africa. The 
second, and by far the more important, was the overthrow of the Caetano 
regime by a military coup in Portugal on the 25th of April, 1974. After 
each of these events we undertook an opinion survey among Whites in Durban.
In both cases we used telephone interviews, and our sample was selected 
randomly from the Durban telephone directory. For the study of reactions 
to the coup in Portugal we selected the sample in such a way as to ensure 
an approximately equal number of English and Afrikaans-speaking respondents, 
since the purely random sample in the first survey produced only 10 
Afrikaans-speaking respondents out of a total of 181. We used telephone 
interviews partly because of lack of funds, and also, in the second case, 
because it was the only way of conducting a large number of interviews 
within a short space of time with a limited number of interviewers. It 
was important to achieve this because the situation was changing daily, 
and if the interviews had been conducted over too long a period, they 
would have lost comparability. However, we are aware that there are serious 
limitations which result from the use of a telephone poll. The most serious 
is the fact that the sample is biased in a particular direction. Tele­
phone subscribers tend to be more affluent and also older than average.
We shall attempt to make allowance for this in analysing the results. All
2.
generalisations made on the basis of results from the two telephone polls 
should be read as being tentative, due to the bias described above and to 
the small samples. The results of the first study are much less interesting 
than those obtained in the second study of reactions to the coup in 
Portugal which reveals some highly significant facts. We shall devote 
most of this paper to an analysis of this second case. In the concluding 
discussion we will also refer to some results of a third, nation-wide 
study, details of which will be given in due course.
I. THE OIL BOYCOTT.
This study was carried out over a period of several weeks during 
December 1973. The oil boycott had been imposed in November. At that time 
the Arab oil-producing states had embargoed the export of oil to a number 
of states which they believed had favoured Israel during the October Arab- 
Israeli War. In return for diplomatic support from the African states, they 
had also agreed to impose a total embargo on the export of oil to Portugal, 
Rhodesia and South Africa. While the general embargo was to last only for 
the duration of the Middle-East crisis, the southern Africa embargo was' 
intended to last until there had been internal policy changes in the affected 
states. However, at the time of our interviews, the embargo had not been 
lifted from any state. In South Africa various fuel-restriction measures 
were already in force.
Our interviewers made 204 calls. The refusal rate was just over 
10%, and 181 successful interviews were processed. Sixty per cent of our 
sample was in the managerial, professional, semi-professional and entre­
preneurial occupational categories; 75% had completed high school or had 
attained a higher level of education; 70% were over 35, and 55% were men.
Thus the sample was heavily biased in the direction of the better-educated 
middle and upper-middle classes. As already mentioned, it was also over­
whelmingly English-speaking.
We wanted to know, firstly, to what extent our respondents realised 
that the boycott was specifically directed at the South African regime, 
rather than against support for Israel, and secondly, what they thought 
should be done about it. Our first question was: "Why do you th in k  th a t
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the Arab s ta te s  are a ttem pting  to  b o y co tt o i l  to  South A frica ? " Sixty- 
five per cent gave answers which showed that they understood that the 
boycott was aimed at the internal policies of the South African Government. 
Only 19% connected it exclusively with the Arab-Israeli dispute, while 
another 6% saw it as part of a general attempt to raise oil prices. It 
is interesting, however, that government supporters were least likely to 
see the boycott as being aimed at the South African Government; the follow­
ing proportions among supporters of different parties saw the boycott as 
being directed against South African internal policies:
National Party 55%
United Party 76%
Progressive Party 70%
All Respondents 65%
Only very tentative conclusions can be drawn from these results, since the 
proportion of National Party supporters in the sample was very small 
(n=39).1 2)
The government reacted fairly optimistically to the boycott, 
arguing that it would have little effect in the long run. At the same 
time, as a precautionary measure, an 80 k.p.h. speed limit and a ban on 
week-end and night petrol sales were imposed. Most respondents shared the 
official optimism, and did not find the restrictions to be serious 
inconveniences:
'When w i l l  the  bo yco tt end?’: 6 months 21%^
\-2 years 30%
2-5 years 9%
5+ indefinite 22%
1) Sample S iz e s :  NP 39 UP 61 PP 25 A ll 181 ( in c lu d in g  n o n -v o te rs
and no a n sw e rs )
2) B alan ce  m aking 100% w ere u n ab le  t o  p ro v id e  an answ er.
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'How much inconvenience w i l l
i t  mean to  you? ' serious 26%
mild 51%
none 19%
Thus over half the sample believed that the boycott would last 
for a relatively short time, and 70% believed that it would not cause them 
any serious personal inconvenience. Government supporters were more 
worried about possible inconvenience, but also more likely to believe that 
it would end relatively soon. Business and professional people were 
slightly more pessimistic on both counts than were blue-collar and lower- 
status white-collar workers.
Most of the respondents thought that there was no real support 
inside South Africa for the boycott. While 31% thought that there was some 
support, all of these gave answers which indicated that they saw such 
support as being very marginal: 11% referred to agitators, extremists,
communists, terrorists or subversives; 8% mentioned Indians or "Arabs" 
(presumably meaning Muslims); 6% referred in vague terms to anti-government 
elements; while only 3% said that they thought that South African Blacks 
in general supported the boycott.
Those who believed that the government should change its policy in 
order to end the boycott were a clear minority in the sample, as the following 
responses indicate:
Policies
should
change
No action
was/is
possible
Fuel­
saving 
poli cy
Government 
should not 
change
Other
responses
How could the b o yco tt  
have been avo ided? ' 17% 63% n.a. n.a. 20%
What should the  
government do now?' 7% 40% 41% - 12%
What should  government 
do in  the longer run?' 31% 12% 17% 19% 21%
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While nearly one-third of the sample believed that change in 
internal policy would be necessary in the longer-term, this belief is quite 
closely correlated with political party preference. It would seem, there­
fore, that this was not a reaction to the boycott itself, but expressed a 
more general belief that change is necessary:
Those mentioning the 
need for some form 
of change.
Those specifying 
no need for 
change.
National Party 12% 45%
United Party 43% 14%
Progressive Party 85% 4%
All Respondents 31% 19%
Also, there was not much difference in the suggested tactics 
between those who attributed the boycott to the Arab-Israeli War and those 
who saw it as being directed against apartheid. These results, together 
with the previously mentioned correlation between party preference and 
perception of the boycott as being directed against apartheid, would seem 
to indicate that the boycott itself was and is probably not a very important 
determinant of opinions and attitudes. Those who believe that change is 
necessary to overcome the boycott are those who tend to believe that change 
is necessary in any case. Those who are in favour of the present situation 
show little sign of changing their attitude as a result of the boycott.
How they would react if the boycott were to begin to have a serious effect 
on life in South Africa is, of course, another question. The response (or 
lack of response) of Rhodesian Whites to post U.D.I. sanctions may be taken 
as some indication of a likely response among White South Africans. Yet, 
White South African society is probably more diversified in ideology and 
interests than Rhodesian White society, and South Africa would have no 
powerful neighbouring state to rely on for assistance. The issue remains 
an open question.
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II. THE PORTUGUESE COUP.
It is almost impossible to over-estimate the significance for 
southern Africa of the military coup in Portugal. It is important for two 
different reasons. Firstly, it has meant that at least one and possibly 
two of the buffer zones between South Africa and the independent African 
states have been removed. This means that anti-government South African 
guerilla movements would at least potentially have direct access to 
South Africa's borders. Also, Rhodesia, another buffer state, would be 
rendered highly vulnerable both to increasingly effective economic sanc­
tions, and to more serious guerilla incursions. Thus the coup threatens 
to change the geo-political balance in southern Africa.
Secondly, it has meant a drastic change in the status of the 
Mocambique guerilla movement, Frelimo. What was seen by the South African 
press as a brutal minority terrorist movement has become a responsible 
governing party, negotiating on friendly and equal terms with the new 
Portuguese Government. Although the coup in Portugal was aimed also at 
ridding Portugal of a right-wing dictatorship, it was clear from the 
beginning that the most important immediate cause was the wish of the 
Portuguese ariTiy to end the colonial war. This involved recognising
a) that the Portuguese army was not able to defeat the 
guerillas; and
b) that the guerillas were legitimate representatives of the 
indigenous people in the Portuguese colonies.
In any struggle the participants develop particular stereotypes 
of the eneiqy, and such stereotypes can play an important part in determining 
the strategies of the combatants. Thus the changed status of Frelimo might 
also threaten the legitimising categories in terms of which White South 
Africans conceptualise the possible outbreak of armed violence in South 
Africa. The concept of the terrorist has assumed tremendous symbolic im­
portance in popular White South African ideology. What happens when a 
terrorist becomes the head of an important neighbouring state? In our survey
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we tried to find out
a) how people interpreted the significance of the coup 
for events in southern Africa;
b) how they saw the guerilla movements in southern Africa; 
and,
c) how they believed that the South African Government should 
react, both in terms of internal and of external policy.
The survey was carried out on the evenings of the 3rd and 4th 
June. At this point the first round of public negotiations between the 
Portuguese Foreign Minister and Frelimo representatives were taking place 
in Lusaka. This and other developments were widely reported in the week­
end and daily press. Apart from the negotiations, which were given 
front-page treatment by the N atal Mercury on the 3rd of June under the 
headline "Tough Line by Frelimo Talks Team", there were also reports on 
the escape of Portuguese Secret Police from Mocambique, and on developments 
within Rhodesia. The Rhodesian African National Council had just rejected 
the Prime Minister Smith's proposals for a constitutional settlement, which 
was reported on the 4th by the Daily News under the page 3 headline "ANC 
wants Body, Not J u s t Hand". There was also a riot in Rhodesia reported in 
the Daily News on the 4th. The overall position, then, was that, while 
there was as yet no official cease-fire in Mocambique, the situation seemed 
to be moving rapidly towards an agreement. In Rhodesia, on the other hand, 
an impasse had evidently been reached. The newspapers made it clear that 
an important reason for the ANC rejection of the very limited White 
Rhodesian offer was that the ANC expected its position to be strengthened 
as a result of developments in Mocambique. It was against this background 
that we conducted our interviews.
Presumably because the topic is so controversial, the refusal rate 
was much higher than in the case of the first study. It verged on 30%, and 
we were left with a total of 213 successful interviews. In order to balance 
English with Afrikaans-speaking respondents we selected a name on a random 
basis from the telephone directory, and then selected the nearest name and 
address from the other language group (i.e. either an Afrikaans or English
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name and directory entry). We ended up with 103 English-speaking respondents, 
96 Afrikaans-speaking, 10 bilingual, and 4 others. The refusal rates for 
the two main groups were very similar. We wanted to make sure that we had an 
adequate number of Afrikaans respondents because many studies have shown that 
in South Africa, home language correlates most closely with political stances 
and opinion differences. However, in this study, with a few notable exceptions 
there was not a great deal of difference between English and Afrikaans speakers
In spite of the then current negotiations with Frelimo, a majority 
of our respondents considered that the eventual government in Mocambique would 
be sympathetic to the present regime in South Africa. The alternatives we 
offered were formulated in general terms. The answer-alternatives and the 
responses were as follows:
All Respondents English Afrikaans
Continued Portuguese con tro l: 19% 13% 24%
Independent m u lti-r a c ia l  
government fr ie n d ly  to  S.A: 28% 32% 26%
H o stile  B lack government: 26% 28% 25%
Independent fr ie n d ly  Black 
government: 8% 8% 8%
H o stile  m u lt i- r a c ia l  
government: I t 5% 7%
Others 5% 7% 3%
Don ' t  Knew 7% 7% I t
Of course it is not possible to be sure what these general categories 
meant to our respondents. For example Frelimo states that its policy is based 
on the principle of non-racialism, which means that race will not be considered 
to be a criterion of status or acceptability. Each individual will have equal 
rights, and a competent White will have just as good a chance of becoming a 
cabinet minister as would a competent Black. Would our respondents describe 
this as a multi-racial government? Also, now that Frelimo has taken over 
the government in Mocambique, there has been much speculation in the press 
that, because of Mocambique's economic dependence on South Africa, Frelimo 
will necessarily have to adopt a conciliatory or friendly posture. Thus one
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could conceivably estimate that there would be a friendly multi-racial 
government, and be referring thereby to a Frelimo Government. However, on 
the whole this seems unlikely. At the time our interviews were conducted 
it was more or less taken for granted by the press that a Frelimo Govern­
ment would be hostile to the present regime in South Africa. Also, it seems 
possible that when White South Africans think of a "multi-racial government" 
they mean a government in which power is shared between representatives of 
the various race groups, rather than a system in which Whites as individuals 
have the same rights as Blacks who would, however, constitute an over­
whelming majority. Thus it is probable that "hostile Black government" 
meant Frelimo, while "friendly multi-racial government" meant a coalition 
of "moderates" from the two main groups: Whites and Mulattos, on the one
hand, and Africans on the other.
From the Table it can be seen that although Afrikaans respondents 
were more likely to expect continued Portuguese control, the percentage 
difference between English and Afrikaners expecting some form of friendly 
government is not very large. Of greater significance was newspaper reader- 
ship. We asked all respondents whether they had read anything in the 
newspaper about the situation either on that day or during the previous week. 
Only 10% of those who had read something that day expected continued 
Portuguese control, while 41% expected a friendly multi-racial government. 
This does not necessarily mean that the contents of that day's newspaper 
had such a great influence. It probably reflects the difference between 
regular newspaper readers and other, less-informed members of the public.
The answer to the above question of course determines the answers 
to the following set of questions, dealing with the implications of the 
situation for Mocambique Whites, for Rhodesia, and for South Africa.
a) Mocambique Whites.
Most of our respondents thought that the Whites in Mocambique 
should remain in the country, and 27% of the sample stressed that the 
Whites should co-operate with the new authorities. However, as the
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following Table indicates, the judgement depended very much on who they 
thought that those authorities would be:
Government Expected in Mocambique
Whites sh o u ld A )
Portuguese 
(n=41)
Friendly
Multi-racial
(n=60)
Hostile Black 
(n=56)
- co-operate 12% 43% 14%
- s ta y 31% 33% 16%
- g e t out 10% 10% 34%
- f i g h t, declare UDI 24% 7% 21%
-  o ther 10% 3% 9%
■ d o n 't  know 12% 3% 5%
Thus three-quarters of the sample believed that Whites should 
remain in Mocambique under a multi-racial government, and nearly half of 
the small number who believed that there would be a Black government of 
the kind that would be friendly towards South Africa also referred to the 
necessity of co-operation (not shown in Table due to small numbers). On 
the other hand just over half the sample believed that, in the case of 
the kind of Black government which would be hostile to South Africa, the 
Whites should either get out or attempt to fight. To the extent that 
these answers reveal the respondents' own attitudes, these answers would 
seem to indicate that they are willing to consider living in a society 
where Blacks have some power or a conciliatory attitude towards White 
interests, but not in a society with the full implications of majority 
rule. Only 30% believe that Whites should be willing to stay under 
majority rule with its implication of hostility towards White privilege. 
However, the answers do not differentiate between those who fear racial 
discrimination under a Black government, and those who fear the loss of 
economic privilege under a democratic government. On the other hand it is
l . Answers do n o t add up t o  100% due t o  ro u n d in g .
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probable that many White South Africans do not distinguish clearly between 
these two aspects of White interests.
b) Rhodesia.
Most respondents seemed to understand the relation between events 
in Mocambique and the future of Rhodesia. While 61% of those who foresaw 
continued Portuguese control predicted no unfavourable effects on the 
present regime in Rhodesia, the proportion falls to 5% for those who think 
that there will be a hostile Black government in Mocambique. But even 
among those who foresee some form of friendly non-Portuguese Government,
42% think that there will be further trouble for Rhodesia. To some extent 
these answers would seem to indicate a general belief in the instability 
of the Rhodesian regime, as well as specific predictions about the con­
sequences of changes in Mocambique.
c) South Africa.
We asked two questions about the consequences for South Africa, 
one in general terms: "What can South A fr ic a  exp ec t? "; and one specifically 
dealing with the possibility of guerilla incursions. The answers to the 
first question were as follows:
"What can South A fr ic a  expect?"
No answer, too ea rly  to  t e l l 23%
No change in  r e la tio n s 22%
Improved r e la tio n s 4%
Trouble, terrorism , e tc . 43%
Other 8%
Thus the majority of those who were willing to express an opinion 
judged that South Africa could expect trouble of some kind, which is an 
interesting contrast to the fact that the majority of those who expressed
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an opinion on the likely nature of the government expected it to be friendly. 
This apparent contradiction is slightly accentuated among members of the 
Afrikaans sample, who are more likely than English-speakers to expect a 
friendly government, but also more likely to predict trouble of some kind.
It is, however, only an apparent contradiction, since it is not unreasonable 
to judge that the situation in Southern Africa is so delicately balanced 
that any major change in one territory might have unfortunate consequences 
for another.
The answer to the question: "What i s  the l ik e lih o o d  o f  te r r o r i s t  
a tta c k s  on South A fr ic a 's  borders?", is very much dependent on predictions 
for Mocambique:
Terrorism  is : Portuguese
Government expected :
« u n f t %  “» « ' •  »'“ k
All
Respondents
-  very l i k e ly 15% 15% 50% 23%
- f a i r l y  l i k e ly 22% 27% 36% 30%
- u n lik e ly 37% 38% 5% 26%
-  im possib le 15% 10% 2% 9%
-  no answer 12% 10% 7% 12%
Thus while only 53% of the sample as a whole believes that such 
attacks are either very or fairly likely, the proportion rises to 86% among 
those who foresee a hostile Black government. Taking the sample as a whole 
the Afrikaners are less likely to foresee terrorist attacks: 44% of the
Afrikaners, as compared to 28% of the English believe that such attacks are 
either unlikely or impossible. The discrepancy between this result and the 
more "pessimistic" response of Afrikaners to the previous question may, 
perhaps, arise because some of the Afrikaners were denying the possibility 
of effective terrorist attacks; they were affirming their faith in the 
present government's capacity (or their collective ability) to forcefully 
discourage terrorism at the outset.
Scarcely any of our sample believed that the South African
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Government should intervene directly in Mocambique. Most spoke of non­
interference or of taking precautions of some sort, and some also 
advocated co-operating with the new government. Again these answers vary 
to some extent, depending on the nature of the new government predicted :
Government expected :
South A frican  p o lic y  
should be : Portuguese
Friendly
Multi-racial
Hosti le 
Black
All
Respondents
-  No change3 non­
in te rv e n tio n 29% 30% 43% 31%
-  Co-operation 10% 25% 14% 16%
- Take p reca u tio n s , watch 34% 18% 19% 23%
- In te r n a l  reform 5% 10% 10% 12%
- Take a c tio n  h o s t i le  to  
Blacks 2% 3% 4% 2%
-  Other 2% 2% 5% 2%
It may be assumed that those who mention the necessity of internal 
reform are in favour of internal reform anyway. The fact that only 10% 
mentioned co-operation with the Portuguese is because this would not have been 
a change in policy. But the fact that 34% of those who predicted Portuguese 
control felt that they needed to specify precautionary measures indicates that 
they were aware that such control was likely to be rather precarious.
To summarise, those who predicted that a hostile Black government 
would come to power in Mocambique believed that this would have serious 
consequences for the present governments of both Rhodesia and South Africa. 
Virtually all of them thought that this would make guerilla attacks on 
South Africa highly likely. One might expect that this would influence all 
their opinions about politics in South Africa. The situation at present 
(July 1975) is that Mocambique is independent under a Frelimo Government 
which will undoubtedly be hostile in attitude if not in action. Can we 
therefore assume that the opinions of those who were predicting such a 
government in June when we carried out our interviews are now characteristic 
of a much wider group? If we assume that we are testing opinions, then that
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would be a reasonable deduction to make. However, it may be that we are 
testing attitudes rather than opinions. The particular beliefs which 
people hold about the situation in Mocambique and its implications may in 
fact be a function of their basic attitudes, rather than of the actual 
evidence. It may be that some people expect trouble and believe in the 
necessity of change, while others are firmly convinced of the capacity 
of the Whites to maintain power, and that one or both of the groups hold 
these beliefs to a great extent irrespective of any particular events or 
evidence. This hypothesis could be tested by another survey in the 
changed circumstances.
There is only one question in this first survey which throws any 
light on the question. The Portuguese coup occurred on the day after the 
South African general election. We asked all the respondents if they would 
have voted differently had the coup occurred before the election. Of course 
it is very difficult to get a true answer to a question of this sort. 
Nevertheless, had the events led many respondents to change their assessment 
of South African politics to a significant extent, we might have expected 
to get some evidence of this. In fact, hardly any of the respondents said 
that they would have voted differently.
Ill THE "TERRORISTS"
In order to understand the political behaviour of White South 
Africans it is important to study their perceptions of the various guerilla 
movements operating in southern Africa, of which Frelimo has been the most 
successful. These movements are usually described as "terrorists", and it 
is unlikely that most White South Africans distinguish between the various 
movements. We therefore followed our questions on Mocambique with a number 
of questions about "terrorism", formulated in general terms, but obviously 
referring to South Africa itself. We have already seen that about half the 
sample thought that terrorist attacks on South Africa's borders were either 
very or fairly likely. Our subsequent questions were concerned with per­
ceptions of the leadership, following and motivation of these terrorists. 
The most striking result of our survey is the response to the question,
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"Who are the  r e a l leaders o f  the te r r o r is ts ? " We offered four alternative 
categories, and the replies were :
Real Leaders o f  the  T e r ro r is ts  are: English Afrikaans
All
Respondents
-  Looal B lacks who have l e f t  the  
country: 19% 4% 12%
- People from o th er  Black co un tries: 5% 2% 4%
-  Black communists: 9% 7% 8%
-  Communists from o u ts id e : 49% 72% 59%
-  Some combinations o f  the above: 8% 4% 7%
- D on't know: 10% 10% 10%
Thus it appears that, of those who give an opinion, over seven
out of ten Afrikaners, and about six out of ten in the sample as a whole
believe that the terrorist movements in southern Africa are lead by non-
Black communists from outside. Given that there is absolutely no convincing
evidence that this is the case, this is an extraordinary result. It raises
two important questions. The first, which of course cannot be answered on
the basis of this survey, is where does this belief come from? The second
is, how do they see these communists operating? We asked two further
questions which help to answer this question. One question was "How many
Blacks in  South A fr ic a  would support the te r r o r is ts ? "
English Afrikaans AllRespondents
Most: 10% 11% 11%
Many bu t no t the m a jority : 38% 31% 35%
Few: 42% 49% 45%
None: 4% 1% 2%
No answer: 7% 7% 7%
Thus between 40% and 50% think that many or most South African
Blacks would support the terrorists, but slightly more think that few or none
would support them. There is no significant correlation between the answers 
to this question and opinions about the real leaders. Those who believe that 
the real leaders are outside communists are not significantly more or less
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likely to believe that they will be supported by few or many local Blacks.
The second question was "Why do the t e r r o r is t s  f ig h t? "  We 
mentioned five possible reasons, and a number of respondent selected more 
than one reason. Two of the reasons may be described, in varying degrees, 
as "legitimate", in that they refer to goals which might at least in theory 
be acceptable to Whites without a total revolution in the social structure. 
These are "the d e s ire  fo r  p o l i t i c a l  r ig h t s " , and " fu s t  a d e s ire  fo r  b e t te r  
co nd itions" . In the following table we have combined these two categories 
which were mentioned respectively by 10% and 13% of the sample. We 
mentioned two other reasons, "a d e sire  to  d r ive  out the W hites" , and "a 
genuine d e sire  fo r  communism", neither of which are likely to have been 
accepted as legitimate by more than an infinitely small fraction of our 
sample. Finally, we mentioned a possible caus^ " in d o c tr in a tio n " . The 
answers were correlated with the opinions about leadership as follows:
T e rro r is ts  
F ight Because 
Of: fll 1English Afrikaans Respondents
Terrorist Leadership -
Local Black Outside 
Blacks Communists Communists
In d o c tr in a tio n 39% 27% 35% 24% 17% 42%
R igh ts  and 
b e t te r  condi­
t io n s 38% 8% 23% 64% 33% 12%
Genuine de sire  
f o r  communism 16% 41% 28% 0% 33% 36%
To d r ive  out 
Whites 19% 32% 26% 28% 28% 24%
No answer 4% 7% 6% 0% 6% 1%
(The totals add up to more than 100 because a number of people gave two
answers).
As is to be expected, those who believe that the leadership is 
essentially local are much more likely to believe that the goals are legiti­
mate. It is also evident from the table that most of these are English- 
speaking. Among those who believe that the leadership is made up of outside 
communists, two schools of thought can be distinguished, if we leave aside 
the small group who nevertheless see the goals as legitimate. Firstly, 
there are those who believe that the followers have been "indoctrinated".
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"Indoctrinated" is a catch-phrase, and it is not at all clear precisely 
what it would mean in this context. But in general terms it presumably 
means that the rank and file: terrorists have in some way been misled by 
the alien communist leadership, and are not fighting for any genuine goals 
of their own. The implication of this is that there are no genuinely 
divisive issues in the society. What problems there are should be 
resolvable by judicious reforms, which would remove the conditions in 
which the communists would be able to mislead some of the dissatisfied 
Blacks. This interpretation is borne out by the fact, as will be shown 
below, that members of this school of thought are more likely to mention 
the desirability of socio-political reforms as a means of coping with 
terrorism.
The second school of thought consists of those who attribute un­
acceptable goals to the terrorists; the genuine desire for communism, and 
the desire to drive out the Whites. At first sight these two goals might 
appear to be very different, the first being a positive goal for a 
particular type of society, while the second is merely negative. But, 
given the stereotype of "communism" held by the average White, it is 
unlikely that they would attribute Blacks with a desire for communism in 
a positive sense. It is particularly significant that the Afrikaners are 
much more likely to mention such a motive, and they are certainly even less 
likely than are the English to conceive of communism as a possible positive 
goal. It seems to us, therefore, that when our respondents speak of a 
genuine desire for communism, they have in mind a rather confused idea of 
an absolute rejection of the present society, rather than any positive 
alternative. This is why we suggest that "driv in g  ou t the W hites" and 
"a genuine d e s ir e  fo r  communism" are, from one point of view, equivalent 
goals. They both represent a perception of an absolute conflict of 
interest; of goals which can in no way be accommodated within the existing 
society. It is of course also significant that this perception should be 
formulated in terms of "communism", and we shall discuss this further. But 
for the moment we wish to stress the difference between those who conceive 
of the threatened guerilla war in terms of goals which can possibly be 
accommodated, and those who conceive of it in terms of an irreconcilable 
conflict/of interest. It is significant, as can be seen from the table,
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that English-speaking respondents are much more likely to speak in terms 
of Blacks who have been lead astray by indoctrination, or who are seeking 
rights and better conditions, while Afrikaners mention indoctrination less 
frequently, and instead perceive the situation in terms of irreconcilable 
goals.
We asked "What i s  South A fr ic a 's  b e s t  defence a g a in s t terrorism ?"  
Most of the answers could be classified as referring either to socio­
political or to military and repressive measures. The question itself does 
encourage a military answer, but it does seem to us to be significant that 
purely socio-political measures are mentioned slightly more frequently by 
those who believe that the leadership consists of local Blacks:
South A fr ic a 's  B est Defence i s :
-  No change
-  M ilita ry -re p re s s iv e
-  S o c io -p o l i t ic a l  change
-  Both
-  Other
-  No answer
Perceptions of Terrorist Leadership
Local
Blacks
Black
Communists
Outside
Communists
8% 0% 8%
36% 56% 44%
36% 22% 21%
0% 6% 9%
8% 6% 10%
12% 11% 8%
There is also some correlation between opinions about motivation 
of the terrorists, and about South Africa's best defence:
Perception of Motivation of Terrorists
South A fr ic a 's  B est Defence i s :
Indoc­
trination
Rights/
Better
Conditions
To Drive
Whites
Out
Communism
- No change 8% 4% 5% 7%
-  M ilita ry -re p re s s iv e 30% 42% 38% 54%
-  S o c io -p o l i t ic a l  change 30% 30% 27% 15%
-  Both 11% 12% 9% 7%
-  Other 9% 6% 11% 12%
-  No answer 12% 6% 6% 5%
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Although the two main alternatives are mentioned a significant 
number of times by all opinion groups, nevertheless those who believe that 
the guerillas are motivated by a genuine desire for communism seem more 
likely to mention a military solution, and less likely to refer to measures 
of reform. On the other hand those who refer to indoctrination seem least 
likely to mention military measures. This tends to confirm the hypothesis 
that they blame the situation on a climate of grievance in which it is 
relatively easy for outside communists to mislead people. The high pro­
portion of those who mention goals which might be accommodated within the 
system who nevertheless mention a military solution perhaps indicates that 
some of them are not willing to countenance even reformist measures.
IV. THE RESULTS IN RELATION TO THOSE OF A
WIDER NATION-WIDE STUDY
We will take the results presented thus far, in combination, as 
broadly indicative of trends in the thinking of White South Africans. The 
nature, size and location of the sample (i.e. Durban only) prevent any 
firm and detailed conclusions being drawn on the basis of specific tabula­
tions we have presented.
The most interesting information which emerges from these results 
is that regarding perceptions of terrorism. This issue is of high salience 
for White South Africans. In a nation-wide urban study undertaken by the 
Institute for Social Research among a probability sample of over 600 
Afrikaans Whites in April-June 1974,1 Respondents were asked to rate the 
importance of the " th re a t o f  communism and terro rism " on a 10 point scale. 
Over 80% rated it as 10 out of 10 in terms of importance; 89% rated it as 
9 out of 10 or more. In addition, 90% of Afrikaners felt that the threat 
had become more important over the past 5 to 10 years. (As a comparison, 
we can quote the finding that only roughly 50% of the respondents rated
1 . The f ie ld w o rk  was u n d e rtak e n  by th e  f irm  M arket R esearch  A fr ic a  (P ty ) 
L td . The sam p lin g  d es ig n  was o f  a tw o -s ta g e  ty p e . C lu s te r s  were 
s e le c t e d  in  c i t i e s ,  towns and h am le ts  th ro u g h o u t th e  c o u n t ry , and in  
each c l u s t e r  ev e ry  n th  d w e llin g  u n i t  was sam pled . The t o t a l  number 
o f  A fr ik a an s  in te rv ie w s  was 6A1.
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"separation  o f  the races" and "p ro tec tio n  o f  Whites aga inst B lack competi­
t io n " as 10 out of 10 in importance. Hence the perceived dangers of 
communism and terrorism seem to take clear precedence over very long- 
established White political concerns as regards current priority and 
importance).
The pattern of results in this study would seem to indicate 
that the perception of the danger of communism and terrorism has a strong 
attitudinal and value component; i.e. that it is not simply a pattern of 
opinions which is formed in response to current developments in southern 
Africa. This emerges from the fact that variations in this perception are 
related to differences in socio-cultural and socio-economic characteristics 
of respondents. For example, social mobility (the holding of an occupation 
of higher status than father's occupation) is inversely correlated with 
such fears and generalised race prejudice as well as 'religiosity' are 
positively correlated with the perceived importance of these threats. As 
mentioned earlier, we must, therefore, consider that the responses of the 
majority of Whites will not shift easily or quickly as a consequence of 
changing geo-political factors in southern Africa or of political pressures 
in general.
Despite this important qualification, however, there is an 
indication from the results of the nation-wide study among Afrikaners that 
the perception of political threat does have some influence on White (in 
this case Afrikaans) responses, and that this influence is not insignifi­
cant in political terms. In the study, questions were asked relating to 
the amount of 'Black discontent' perceived by the respondents. The two 
most important were: "Eon co nten ted  or d isco n ten ted  w ith  th e ir  circum stances 
do you th in k  the m a jority  o f  Bantu (A fricans) are a t  the moment?" and, "Bow 
long do you th in k  our p resen t r a c e -s itu a tio n  can continue w ith o u t crea tin g  
ser ious  problems fo r  W hites?" Responses to these two items were combined 
into a single index. Results on this index appeared to be independent of 
socio-cultural background factors like status-mobility, religiosity and 
other socio-cultural factors. (Although graduates in the sample were 
clearly more likely than others to perceive Africans as being relatively 
contented; a pattern which is difficult to explain).
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However, the perceived extent of Black discontent was mildly but 
consistently related in a positive direction to a greater expressed 
willingness to countenance internal reform (this pattern not being due to 
any intervening factors like education or socio-cultural characteristics, 
as the remarks in the previous paragraph would suggest). For example, 38% 
of those Afrikaners who saw Blacks as discontented were willing to subscribe 
to the idea of greater consultation with Black leaders, or to a policy of 
granting reforms for Blacks in "White" areas, compared with 26% among those 
who saw Blacks as contented.
In regard to concessions to Blacks which respondents felt should 
be made, the following pattern emerged, according to whether Blacks were 
perceived to be discontented or not.
Statements Which Respondents Endorsed Blacks Perceived to be:
Contented Discontented
"Whites and non-W hites should take dec isio ns  
j o i n t l y  regarding n a tio n a l a f fa ir s " :
(n=252)
8%
(n = 8 7 )l)
12%
"There should  be permanent r ig h ts  fo r  
Coloureds in  White areas": CO 15%
"There should  be permanent r ig h ts  fo r  
c e r ta in  Bantu (A fricans) in 'W h itd 'a rea s" : 4% 12%
"There should  be h igher wages fo r  non- 
U h ites" (comp le te  agreem ent): 14% 34%
"Bantu (A fricans) should  be allo tted  to  
perform  s k i l l e d  work in  "W hite'\ areas": 17% 32%
"Bantu (A frican) Trade Unions should be 
o f f i c i a l l y  recog n ised": 12% 23%
Furthermore, 16% of those respondents who perceived Blacks to be 
contented as opposed to 22% of those perceiving them to be discontented 
gave a 9 or 10 out of 10 "importance-rating" to the statement "There is
1 . The re a s o n  why th e  combined sam ple s i z e s  in  th e  t a b l e  a r e  low er th an  
th e  s i z e  o f  th e  o v e r a l l  sam ple l i e s  in  th e  f a c t  t h a t  re sp o n d e n ts  were 
s e le c t e d  i n to  th e  two c a te g o r ie s  o f  B lack  c o n te n tm e n t/d is c o n te n tm e n t 
on th e  b a s i s  o f  c o n s i s te n t  an sw ers  t o  more th a n  one s c h e d u le  q u e s t io n  
Hence c e r t a in  re sp o n d e n ts  whose answ ers  were n o t c o n s i s te n t  w ith  one 
a n o th e r  were o m itte d .
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too l i t t l e  c o n su lta tio n  between White and ncn-W hite leaders".
These results from the study among a national sample of urban 
Afrikaners seem to lend support to one of the broad and tentative conclu­
sions which can be drawn from the telephone surveys conducted in Durban. 
There seems to be a relationship between a knowledge that Black people 
in South Africa are discontented and the expression of a willingness to 
support certain concessions and reforms as they would affect Blacks, 
even in "White" areas of the country. Although support for policies of 
reform seems, in large measure, to be a function of socio-culturally 
linked attitudes and values, it seems, nonetheless, that we may posit some 
degree of independent importance to Whites' perceptions of Black discon­
tent. Perceptions of Blacks as being discontented certainly would appear 
to affect the way in which the motivations of the guerilla movements and 
their leaders are viewed.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Broadly speaking, and for the moment ignoring the question of 
"communism", it is possible to distinguish from the telephone survey 
results, three general categories of response in regard to "terrorism".
1) Those who see the phenomenon as being in some way related 
to internal problems of a kind which can be overcome by 
reform and who therefore believe that the government's 
reaction should at least include some internal reforms 
(i.e. Black South Africans have real problems which 
either make them subject to outside manipulation or could 
make them revolt, and these problems can be overcome by 
reform).
2) Those who see it as being related to internal problems, 
but to internal problems which could only be resolved by 
unthinkable or unacceptable concessions, and who therefore 
advocate a policy of repression (i.e., since the demands of 
Black South Africans are unacceptable to Whites, the Black 
discontent must be suppressed).
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3) Those who see it as being purely an external phenomenon 
requiring a purely repressive military solution (i.e. "it 
is all an external communist plot").
These three response-types are also consistent with the broad 
pattern of findings in the national sample among Afrikaners.
Whether the local issues and causes of discontent can be 
resolved in a way satisfactory to both Whites, with their present interests 
and goals, and Blacks, with their present needs and goals, is a separate 
question. The disagreement between those Whites holding positions 1) and 
2) outlined above is thus, to some extent at least, a disagreement over 
what is "acceptable" to Whites; it is a value question. But it is also 
partly a question of the interpretation of Black grievances. Some people 
holding position 1) might be saying that Black grievances are relatively 
minor, so that White authorities could cope with them without making 
major concessions, while some of those holding position 2) may be saying 
that Blacks have major grievances which can only be resolved by major 
and unacceptable concessions by Whites. Since the difference may be 
due to perceptions of the extent of the grievances, it is important to 
consider that the evidence we have would tend to suggest that the 
grievances of Blacks are large, and will require major changes in policy 
in order to be assuagedJ)
Not all respondents in the telephone survey fit neatly into one 
or other of the above three categories. But, although not far short of
X) One r e c e n t  example o f  an e m p ir ic a l  s tu d y  ad d uc in g  e v id e n c e  o f  w id e­
s p re a d  s e r io u s  d is c o n te n t  among B lacks i s  t h a t  o f  L. Schlemmer (1 9 7 5 ). "Black A ttitu d e s :  Adaptation and R eaction", p a p e r p re s e n te d  a t  th e
Annual C on ference o f  th e  A s s o c ia tio n  f o r  S oc io lo gy  in  S o u th ern  A fr ic a ,  
S w az ila n d , J u ly ,  1975. (Mimeo; p u b l i c a t io n  fo r th c o m in g .)
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half of the respondents consider that terrorists would be supported by 
many or most Black South Africans, only about a third of the sample as 
a whole seems to think that socio-economic reforms are needed. The 
majority of the English-speaking group and a large majority of the 
Afrikaners adopt positions 2) or 3): they see terrorism as resulting
either from illegitimate Black demands, or else as having no relation to 
internal problems, since they see it as stemming from a world-wide 
communist conspiracy. English-speakers are more likely to think in 
terms of resolvable issues (albeit possibly issues which are capitalised 
on by communists) whereas Afrikaans respondents are more likely to think 
in terms of entirely irresolvable issues. Over 70% of the Afrikaners, 
as opposed to 35% of the English, believe that terrorists fight either 
out of a genuine desire for communism, or else in order to drive out the 
Whites. Thus most Afrikaners seem to see the situation in terms of 
clearly antagonistic and irreconcilable interests. However, the position 
is complicated by the question of "communism." Some, perhaps the majority, 
see the question as being exclusively a conflict between South Africa and 
communism, while others see it as being a conflict between Blacks and 
Whites within South Africa, with or without the issue of communism as a 
factor.
In commenting on and trying to assess the significance of these 
positions, we have necessarily to give our own answers to the questions 
raised. For reasons of space it is not possible to give detailed data 
to support our judgements. However, if we consider the evidence con­
tained both in speeches of Black politicians and in studies carried out 
by social and political scientists, we may conclude that there is over­
whelming evidence of widespread discontent amongst Blacks as regards the 
nature of White rule in southern Africa,^ and, that there is no evidence
1) Here ag a in  we can r e f e r  to  th e  r e c e n t  s tu d y  o f  B lack a t t i t u d e s  by 
Schlemmer { ib id )  which c o n ta in s  r e f e r e n c e s  t o  a number o f  o th e r  
s tu d ie s  which p ro du ce  ev id en ce  o f  B lack g r ie v a n c e s .
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that "outside communists" are significant active agents in the various 
guerilla campaigns in southern Africa. The various movements have 
received and continue to receive support from communist governments, but 
they appear to be led by local people concerned with local issues and 
are aimed at local solutions.
In comparing what appear to be the facts of the case with the 
responses of people interviewed in the Durban telephone survey on the 
coup in Portugal, as well as the responses of the Afrikaners interviewed 
in the nation-wide survey, two major points emerge.
1) The first point concerns the typical perceptions among Whites 
of the situation and reactions of Black South Africans. Both studies 
suggest that a slight majority of Whites perceive rank and file Blacks 
as being reasonably contented with their situation in South Africa. The 
reader will recollect that in the telephone survey in Durban only 10% of 
English-speakers and 11% of Afrikaners felt that most Blacks would 
support the terrorists. Among English-speakers, 45% expressed the view 
that "few" or "none" would support the terrorists and the proportion 
among Afrikaners was not significantly different at 50%. Only 30% of 
respondents in the first telephone survey believed that Blacks supported 
the oil boycott. In the nation-wide study among Afrikaners, 55% of 
respondents considered that Africans in South Africa are either "con­
tented" or "fairly contented", and only 11% felt that they are "very 
discontented".
Both these studies strongly suggest that, while White poli­
tical motivations are in considerable measure a function of fairly basic 
values and attitudes, some of the variability in policy orientations 
is related to perceptions of political pressure on the status-quo in 
South Africa, whether from internal or external sources. We may posit, 
therefore, that there is fairly widespread awareness of the link between 
these political pressures (terrorism being the most important of them) 
and the situation of Blacks in southern Africa. However, among some
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people this awareness is inadequate or negative in consequence, since it 
tends to be perceived in highly emotionally-laden terms which make 
rational responses to the perception of pressure difficult.
We would like to conclude our discussion of this first major 
point with the suggestions:
a) That there is a great need to make more White South Africans aware 
of the extent and intensity of Black grievances in southern Africa, 
and of the legitimacy of the reasons for these grievances; and
b) that the grievances and discontent of Blacks does not or need not 
take the form of anti-White hostility or racist fervour, and that 
there is little objective basis for the kind of irrational fears 
that many Whites evince. To give but one example, since assuming 
power in Mocambique, President Samora Machel has constantly re­
iterated that he does not blame Whites for the earlier situation 
which existed under colonial rule, but rather the kind of politico- 
economic system that existed in that territory. Unfortunately, 
press coverage on events elsewhere in independent Africa has tended
to create an impression of instability, authoritarian rule, factional­
ism and arbitary action against individuals and aliens (mainly Indians 
in East Africa) which Whites perceive as threatening to themselves. 
What the press has not been able to convey successfully, however, is 
that trends and events like these are the consequence not of some 
imbedded characteristic of African political systems, but rather of 
a range of complex structural characteristics in these societies 
which need not exist in South Africa. Those African states which are 
characterised by the kind of unpredictability and lack of order re­
ferred to above (and this is not a feature of al1 African states) 
display the effects of, inter alia:
- low levels of economic development;
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- great material inequality between elites and masses, 
and between urban and rural levels of welfare;
- inadequate political mobilisation and political partici­
pation among the populations generally, which allows 
arbitrary action by a few political leaders;
- ruthless trading and employment practices by minorities, 
the members of which have shown little identification with 
the interests of the new states;
- governmental bureaucracies based on former colonial "control 
models rather than on models appropriate to developing 
regions;
- the relative absence of social, economic, political, civic 
and cultural organisations in intermediate positions between 
the people and politicians which could create a system of 
checks and balances in the political life of these societies
It is almost redundant to add that a more developed and 
differentiated social structure like that of South Africa would be most 
unlikely to display the characteristics mentioned above, provi ded that 
the problem of White-Black inequality were to be tackled constructively 
and Black people at large were incorporated into organised political and 
economic activity. If the press and other media in South Africa consider 
that they have a social responsibility, then this, broadly, is the kind 
of understanding which should be disseminated among Whites.
2) The second major point is that the idea of "communism" plays a 
role which bears virtually no relation to the facts of the case. There 
is a problem in interpreting the significance of this fact; it is diffi­
cult to know exactly what our respondents understood by the term 
"communism". We would suggest, in fact, that the term no longer has any 
precise analytical content for most White South Africans. To the extent 
that it has a specific meaning, it is probably connected with the idea of 
Soviet or Chinese imperialism. But, beyond this, it would seem to have 
a much vaguer and more pervasive role, as an expression or a name for the
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unthinkable. When 41% of our Afrikaans respondents say that they think 
that the terrorists are motivated by a "genuine desire for communism", it 
is unlikely that they have in mind a desire for a specific form of politi­
cal and economic organisation. It is more likely that they mean by it 
some literally unthinkable order in which everything is turned upside down; 
Blacks no longer keep in their place and all sorts of patterns of social 
life are changed.
Of course, this interpretation is purely speculative, but two 
things are clear:
a) To the extent that the term "communism" functions purely as an 
emotive word to designate the unthinkable, it confuses the issue 
and prevents people from thinking about things to which they should 
be giving very serious thought.
b) The belief that terrorism is associated with an external comnunist 
plot aiming at foreign domination of South Africa will have even 
more serious consequences. If the aim of the adversary is foreign 
domination, what possible compromise can there be? It becomes 
quite out of the question to accord any legitimacy to, or to con­
sider the grievances of, the "terrorist" movements. Military re­
pression is the only possible response.
If, as we have said, there is no evidence that terrorist groups 
in southern Africa are Usd by "outside communists", why is the belief so 
widespread? Of course we cannot answer this question from our surveys.
A full answer would require further investigation of what White South 
Africans understand by the term communism, and a detailed study of the 
news media through which a particular idea of communism is projected.
But it does seem to us to be possible to say that the press, including the 
English-language press, has a large responsibility in projecting a crude 
and oversimplified idea of "communism". There is rarely any clear analysis
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of Soviet or Chinese foreign policy, or of the very varied policies and 
practices of the various communist parties and communist governments 
around the world. "Communism" is an extraordinarily complex phenomenon 
and it should be treated as such. It is necessary to distinguish between 
at least the following:
1) The various political and social theories contained under the broad 
rubric "marxism".
2) The divergent internal political practices of different communist 
governments.
3) The different and sometimes conflicting foreign policies of the 
various communist governments, and the differences in policy to­
wards different parts of the world. For example, one cannot 
necessarily draw conclusions about Soviet policy in Africa on the 
basis of a study of Soviet policy toward the states in the Soviet 
Union’s eastern European buffer zone.
4) The relation between the policy of and support for any particular 
national communist party, and the local political problems of that 
country.
5) The different relations of various communist parties towards 
established centres such as Moscow, Peking and Havana.
6) The relation between various communist governments and various 
national liberation movements.
For South Africa this last point perhaps is the most important.
It is vital to untangle the relationship between communist great power 
policy, local communist aims and general social problems when analysing 
"wars of national liberation". In countries like Vietnam and Cambodia, 
for example, it is simply impossible to understand events by using a single
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undifferentiated concept of "communism". Mocambique is a case in point, 
and the adequacy of our press as a source of information and analysis must 
surely be brought into question here. Before April the 25th, 1974, any 
reasonably well-informed reader of the western press abroad knew that 
Portugal was ruled by a dictatorship which governed by the widespread use 
of coercion and torture, and which was fighting colonial wars against 
guerilla movements which had widespread popular support. Why was it that 
the South African press was only able to discover this after the 25th? 
Until that date South Africans were still being regaled with stories of 
model prisons, Portugal's civilising mission, and the pointless atrocities 
committed by a handful of terrorists. It would seem that South African 
journalists in Portuguese territories simply accepted without question 
the publicity handouts of the Caetano regime. For example, many if not 
all South African newspapers joined in the charade of denying the very 
existence of the town of Wiriyamu when the story of the massacre there 
was finally broken.
Of course, there were exceptions, just as there are occasional 
exceptions to the inadequate treatment of communism. But it is our 
contention that the overall effect of the press is to propagate a crude 
and inadequate view of what is happening in the world. This would be of 
little importance if it were merely an academic question of fact. But 
it is not only an academic question. As the results of our surveys show, 
there is a close relation between the way in which White South Africans 
interpret the outside world and the way in which they understand what 
happens in South Africa. While White South Africans have the mistaken 
belief that violent conflict in southern Africa is largely a question of 
communist instigation, they will not be able to see the real causes, and 
a peaceful resolution of South Africa's problems will be impossible.
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